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L\ THE SUl'HE:\lE COLHT OF THE STATE OF UT,\H 
------------oooOooo------------
AETC\_\ LIFE ~\i\D CASU_.\LTY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Hespondent, 
Case No. 15306 
ll:\ITED P_A.CIFIC /RELIANCE 
Ii'\STJRX::\CE COMPANIES, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
------------oooOooo------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
Judge 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted respondent's l\Iotion for Sum-
mary Judgment and denied appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEi\L 
Respondent requests that the .Judgment of the District 
Court be affirmed. 
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STYIE\11·::\T OF 1· .\CT::i 
On July 1, 1~)/0, Lr•itcd PctClflc/Fk!JcuJce lnsur 1f!Ce 
Coll<[nni<':-; (hercin:tftcr "Lnit·.~d Petcific") i:-;'""-'d to Rcginct Grarje !':·> 
ducts Compcll1y (hcrcin:,fter "Hcgina") its Comprehensive LiaLi!Jt; 
Insurance Policy, l\o. CLP :32221 effecti\ e from .July 1, 1970 to Jul: _ 
1973, with a limit of $1,000,000 for personal inJuries arbing from c 
"· 
occurrence. At all times material herein, :\etna Life and Casualty 
(hereinafter "Aetna") was the liability insurance carrier of Heublein, 
Incorporated (hereinafter "Heublein"). 
On December 31, l!.l70, one George Shuput, while open-
ing a bottle of Wedding Party Pink Champagne was struck in the eye b, 
the champagne cork and severely injured. 
Effective February 1, 1971, having been accomplished 
on January 28, 1971, Regina, a California corporGtion, merged with 
Heublein, Incorporated, a Connecticut corporGtion. Article II of the 
Plan and Agreement of ;\!erger between Heublein Gnd Regina sbted: 
The laws which shall govern the 
Surviving Corpor:1tion are the laws 
of the State of Connecticut. The 
CertificGte of Incorporation of 
Heublein as in effect on the Effec-
tive Date sh:1ll be the Certificate 
of lf'corporation of the s~Jrdving 
Corporation. The name of the 
Survivinc; Corpo1·aLion shall be 
'II,_:uhlein, Inc .. 1 • 
-2-
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On Jum· 7, 1 ~~~. suit \·:2s fil~d in United States District 
Coctct fot' the District of Utah, Central Di'.'ision, Ci\-ili\o. c 195-73, 
by Gccorg~ Shuput etg::~inst Heublein. il trial was held, followed by an 
aprkal to the Tenth Circuit Court which resulted in the case being re-
manded for a new trial. The case was subsequently settled for the sum 
of Sl8, 750.00 in September of 1975, and plaintiff incurred expenses in 
connection with its defense and handling in the form of attorney's fees 
and costs in the sum of $9,637. 39. Defendant, although aware of all 
the facts before this Court, refused the tender and did not participate 
in the defense of the suit or its settlement. 
Concededly, the defendant United Pacific never did issue 
a policy of insurance to Heublein prior to January 17, 1971. On the 
other hand, United Pacific, admittedly, insured Regina at the time of 
George Shuput's accident, which took place before the~ rger between 
Regin3. and Heublein. In the Shuput vs. Heublein lawsuit, Regina was 
not named as a party to the action. 
In the lower court, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment -_..-as granted and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
denied for the reason that on the date of the accident, United Pacific 
was the only insurance carrier for Regina; that the Shuput claim was 
covered by the United Pacific policy; that Heublein succeeded to the 
rights of Regina by effect of the merger which took place after the 
Shuput accident; and that the liability for the injury was fixed at the time 
of ;he Clccident. 
For purposes of this Brief the applicable provisions of 
-3-
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Aetna's insurance policy al'L' listed hdow: 
6. Other Insurdtlce. The insurance 
afforded by this policy is pril!l:try in-
surance, except when slated to apply 
in excess of or ccmtingcnt upon the 
absence of other insurccnce. \Vb.en 
this insurance is primary and the 
insured has other insurance which is 
stated to be applicable to the loss on 
an excess or contingent basis, the 
amount of the company's liability un-
der this policy shall not be reduced 
by the existence of such other insur-
ance. 
When both this insurance and other 
insurance apply to the loss on the same 
basis, whether primary, excess or con-
tingent, the company shall not be liable 
under this policy for a greater propor-
tion of the loss than that stated in the 
applicable contribution provision below: 
(a) -,- -. , -.-
(b) Contribution by Limits. If any of 
other insurance does not provide 
for contribution by equal shares, 
the company shall not be liable 
for a greater prorortion of such 
loss than the applicable limit of 
liability under this policy for such 
loss bears to the total applicable 
limit of liability of all valid and 
collectible insurance against such 
loss. 
For purposes of this Drief, the applicable provisions.c.; 
United P<J.cific' s insurance policy are listed below: 
UNITED PACIFIC TNSTJHANCE COiVIP:O.:\Y 
(_'\ Stock Insurance Com p:my, herein co.llcd 
the company), in consideration of the po.y-
-4-
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ment of the premium and subJ~Ct 
to all the teems of this policy, agrees 
with the insured named in the declara-
tions, hereinafter called "named 
insured," as follows: 
!::\SURING AGREEi\IENTS 
I. Liability. To pay on behalf of the 
insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay 
by reason of the liability for damages 
(a) imposed upon him by law or (b) 
assumed by him under any contract or 
agreement wholly in writing, because 
of: Bodily Injury, 
Property Damage; 
further, to defend any suit against the 
insured in which such damages are 
sought, reserving to the company the 
right to investigate, negotiate and 
settle any claims or suit. 
Definitions of interest are as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
As Used in This Policy: 
(a) "bodily injury" means bodily injury 
sickness or disease sustained by a per-
son, including (1) death resulting there-
from and (2) damages for care and loss 
of services because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease. 
(c) "occurrence" means an accident, 
an event or a continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions causing, during 
the policy period, bodily injury or pro-
perty damage neither expected nor 
intended by the insured. All injury or 
-5-
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poration; 
dan1:.1ge arising out of cxpo.oun: 
due to substantially the same 
general condition sh~.dl be con-
sidered as arising out of one 
occurrence. 
(d) "insured" means the named in-
sured, his spouse, if a resident 
in the same household, and: . . " 
Named insured in this case would be: 
1. Regina Grape Products Company, a California Cor. ; 
2. Regina Grape Products Company, a California Cor. 
poration, doing business as: 
(a) Ellena Brothers 
(b) Poca Mas Wine Company 
(c) Garrett Bottling Company 
(d) San Sevine Vineyard Company 
(e) Sycamore Valley Vineyards 
(f) Verdemont Vineyard Company 
3. John B. Ellena and Arliss T. Ellena. 
For purposes of this Brief the following are the appli-
cable statutory provisions: 
amended): 
1. General Statues of Connecticut § 33-37l(c) (1958 as 
Upon the effectiveness of :1 merger or consolidation: 
(a) The merging corporations or consolidating 
corporations p:1rty to the pl:1n of merger 
-6-
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amended): 
or consolidation shall be a 
sil';:;le corporo.tion which, in 
thee case of a merger, shall 
be that corporation designated 
in the plan of merger as the 
S'Jrviving corporation and, in 
the case of a consolidation, shall 
be the new corporation provided 
for in the plan of consolidation; 
(b) The separate existence of all cor-
poration parties to the plan of 
merger or consolidation, except 
the surviving or new corporation, 
shall cease; 
(c) The surviving or new corporation 
shall thereupon and thereafter, to 
the extent consistent with its Certi-
ficate of Incorporation as in effect 
upon effecting the merger or consoli-
dation, possess all the rights, privi-
leges, immunities and franchises, as 
well of a public as of a private nature, 
of each of the merging or consolidating 
corporations; and all property, real, 
personal and mixed, and all debts 
due on whatever account, and all other 
choses in action, and all and every 
other interest, of or belonging to or 
due to each of the corporations so 
merged or consolidated, shall be 
taken and transferred to and vested 
in such single corporation without 
further act or deed; and the title to 
any real estate, or any interest therein, 
vested in any of such corporation shall 
not revert or be in any way impaired by 
reason or such merger or consolidation. 
[Emphasis Added]. 
2. General Statutes of Connecticut § 33-369(e) (1953 as 
-7-
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amended): 
The Surviv1ng or i\cw corpor~tion shall 
henceforth be responsible, and lid!Jlc for 
all the liabilities, oblige1tions and penal-
tics, including liability to descending 
shareholders, or each of the merging 
or consolidating corporations; and any 
claim existing or action or proceeding, 
civil or criminal, pending by or against 
any such corporation may be prosecuted 
as if such merger of consolidation had not 
taken place, or such surviving or new 
corporation may be substituted in its 
place; and any judgment rendered against 
any of the merging or consolidating 
corporations may be enforced against the 
surviving or new corporation. . .. 
3. Utah Code Annotated § 6-10-72(b)(3) (1953 as 
. . . The effect of such merger or conso-
lidation shall be the same as in the case 
of the rre rger or consolidation of domestic 
corporations. If the suviving or new 
corporation is to be governed by the laws 
of this state. If the surviving or new 
corporation is to be governed by the 
laws of any state other than this state, 
the effect of such merger or consolida-
tion shall be the same as in the case of 
the merger or consolidation of domestic 
corporation [s] except insofar as the laws 
of such other state provide otherwise. 
4. Utah Code Annotated§ 16-10-71(e) (1953 as amerc 
Such surv·iving or new corporation shall 
thence forth be responsible and liable for 
all the liabilities and obligations of each 
of the corporations so merged or conso-
lidated; and any claim existing or action 
or proceeding pending by or against any 
of such corporation may be prosecuted 
as if such merger or consolidation bad 
-8-
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not taken place, or such survivincr 
or new corporation may be sub- "' 
stituted in its place. . .. 
This appeal arises out of a judgment adverse to 
appellant in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
wherein the lower court held that United Pacific was obligated to 
inde~c:1nily Aetna in the sum of $28,387.39, for the reason that 
United Pacific, at the time of the Shuput accident, was the only 
insurer covering the same and that Heublein succeeded to the right 
or Regina by effect of the merger. 
POINT I. 
THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS MEAN-
ING OF UNITED PACIFIC'S INSURANCE 
POLICY IS THAT REGIT\IA GRAPE PRO-
DUCTS COMPANY WAS AN INSURED 
ON DECEMBER 31, 1970. 
It is agreed by both parties that on July 1, 1970, United 
Pacific issued to Regina its Policy No. CLP 322 21 effective from 
July 1, 1970, to July 1, 1973, with a limit of $1,000,000, for 
perw nal injuries arising from each occurrence. It is further 
agreed that on the date of the accident, December 31, 1970, the 
Comprehensive Policy of Liability Insurance was in force covering 
Regina. 
-9-
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POll\:T II. 
UPON MERGER OH CONSOLIDAT!Ol\, 
CAUSES OF ;\CTION AGPdNST THE 
MERGED OR CONSTITUENT COI\I-
PAJ\Y ORDii'\"\RILY SHOULD BE 
BROUGHT AGAINST THE NEW COi\1-
PANY INTO WHICH THE OTHER IS 
MERGED. 
George Shuput filed suit against Heublein on June 7, 
1973. Appellant contends that there is no liability on the part of 
United Pacific bec:-tuse (1) no suit was ever instituted by Shuput 
against Regina, and (2) there was never a final JUdgment by Shuput 
against Regina. 
The traditional rule that causes of action against 
a merged company should be brought against the new company 
is stated in Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, Vol. 15, § 7170 
"Right of Creditors to Sue Constituent Corporation after Consolida-
tion," p. 310 as follows: 
Upon merger of consolid~ltion, causes of 
action against the merged company or a 
constituent comp::ltly ordinarily should 
be brought against the new company or 
the company into which the other is merged. 
·where the constituent or absorbed com-
panies cease to exist, no action can be 
maintained against such companies after 
the consolidation or merger, unless the 
right to sue is reserved by the statute 
-10-
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authorizing the consolidation, ;:,s 
by preserving their sepJ.ratc 
existence for purpose of suits 
or otherwise .... [Emphasis 
Added]. 
The following cases are cited in support of that general 
proposition: Lam vs. White, 216 Ky. 134, 287 S. W. 530; Lee vs. 
Stillwater and M. St.R. Co., 140 App. Div. 779, 125 N.Y. S. 840; 
Dalmas vs. Phillipsburg and S. V. R. Company, 254 Pa. 9, 98 
A. 796. 
Connecticut by statute, permits a suit against a merg-
ed corporation to be directed against the new corporation, to wit: 
General Statutes of Connecticut § 33-369{e) {1958 as amended), 
The Surviving or New corpora-
tion shall henceforth be respon-
sible and liable for all the 
liabilities, obligations and pen-
alties, including liability to 
descending shareholders, or 
each of the merging or consoli-
d;:,ting corporations; and any 
claim existing or action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, 
pending by or against any such 
merger of consolidation had 
not taken place, or such sur-
viving or new corporation may 
be substituted in its place; and 
any judgment rendered against 
any of the merging or consolidating cor-
-11-
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which reads: 
poL1tions rua.Y L>c enforced ag~1inst 
the surviving ot· new corporzttion. 
[Emphasis Added]. 
Utah has a similar statutP, U.C.A. § 16-10-71{e) (He 
Such surviving or new corporations 
shall henceforth be responsible and 
liable for all the liabilities and obli-
gations of each of the corporations 
so merged or consolidated; and any 
claim existing or action or proceed-
ing pending by or against any of such 
corporations may be prosecuted as 
if such merger or consolidation had 
not taken place, or such surviving or 
new corporation may be substituted in 
its place .... [Emphasis Added]. 
In short, because the lawsuit by Shuput was initiated in 
June 1973, approximately two years after the Regina-Heublein merger, 
it was entirely proper for Shuput to direct his complaint against 
Heublein, the surviving corporation. By suing Heublein, Shuput was, 
in fact, suing Regina. Therefore, it is not accurate to state that no 
suit was ever instituted by Shuput against Regina, nor that there had 
never been a final judgment against Regina. 
POINT III. 
WHEN AN ACCIDENT COVERED BY A COl\1PRE-
HENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY OCCURS, 
THE COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY POLICY C/ISTS. 
UPON THE INSURER CONTINGENT COL\T&'\.CTU,\L 
OBLIG-\ TIONS TO THE INSUTIED. 
Since Seider vs. Roth, 17 N. Y.2d 111,269 N. Y.S. 2a:'. 
216 N.E.2d 312 (1066), courts have generally held that as soon as an 
-12-
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accir!c:~,t occurs there J.re imposed upon the insurer contractual obli-
gc.t iu:l.ci '.'.l:!ch !Cl u st be c onside reel "debts" owing to the insured. A !though 
the Seider vs. Roth, supra, position on the jurisdictional issue (i.e. 
tr.a.t the contingent contractual obligation is a "debt" which may be 
attached to pro\·ide quasi-in- rem jurisdiction) has been hotly debated 
and generally rejected; nevertheless, the majority of courts recognize 
that once an accident covered by insurance occurs there are imposed 
upon the insurer contingent contractual obligations which must be consi-
dered "debts" owing to the insured. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Housley vs. Anaconda, 19 
Utah 2d 124, 429 P.2d 390 (1967) although primarily discussing whether 
the garnishment of such a contingent debt was sufficient to invoke juris-
diction, recognized that after an accident covered by insurance and prior 
to judgment, the insurer owes contingent contractual obligations to the 
insured. In that case defendant Cox, while driving a motor vehicle owned 
by tl'e _-\naconda Company, drove into the rear of an automobile being 
dri\·en by the plaintiff Shirlee H. Housley, and owned by the plaintiff 
Reese C. Housley. Shortly after the accident, Cox departed from the 
State of Ctah. The plaintiff caused a Writ of Garnishment to be served 
:1pon. the Traveler's Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle in-
,~ 0 lnod in the collision. The Utah Supreme Court recognized the insurer's 
contingent obligation as follov:s: 
We are of opinion that prior to the 
plaintiff obtaining a judgment against 
-13-
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defendant Cox in the main ~1ction, 
the obligation of the Insurance 
Company is contingent and not 
subject to garnishment. [Empha-
sis Added). 
For other cases throughout the country recognizing contingent sirnihr 
contractual obligations see: Javorek vs. Superior Court of Monterey 
County, 131 Cal. Reptr. 768, 552 P. 2d 728 (1976); Robinson vs. Shear: 
& Sons, Inc., 429 F. 2d 83 (3rd Cir. 1970); Ricker vs. LaJoie, 314 
F. Supp. 201(d) (Vt. 1970); Werner vs. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 52S 
P.2d 370 (dicta) (1974); Johnson vs. Farmers Alliance MutualAssura~,· 
Co., 499 P. 2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); Kirchman vs. iVlikula, 258 S. 2d 70! 
(La.App. 1972); Howard vs. Allen, 254 S.C. 255, 
(1970); DeRentiis vs. Lewis, 258 A. 2d 464 (R.I. 
Donnelley, 413 Pa. 474 198 A. 2d 513 (1964). 
176 S.E. 2d 127 ' 
1969); and~~ 
In short, it is respondent's position that the contingent 
contractual obligations owed by United Pacific to Regina passed, by 
virtue of the Merger Agreement and applicable Connecticut law, to 
Heublein. Moreover, it asserts that such a transfer is consistent wii. 
Utah law and public policy. 
POINT IV. 
UNDER APPLIC\BLE CONNECTICUT LAW 
i 
G. S.C. § 33-369(c) (1958 as amended), NOTH-
ING IS LOST BY THE JVIERGEH OF CORPOHl\-
TlO;'\;S AND ANY RIGHT LAWFULLY BELONG-
ING TO AJ\Y OF COH.POHATIONS fdERGED 
TOGET!!Efl Cc\ :\'BE L'\SSERTE)) BY TilE SGH-
VlVINC CORPORATION. 
-14- i 
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The merger bet\\een Regina, a California corporation, 
a Connecticut corporation, took place on February 1, 1971. 
The Sun iving Corporation was "Heublein, Inc." The laws which 
go,-erneJ the Surviving Corporation were the laws of the State of Connec-
ticut, ·:.-hich provide in pertinent part: 
§ 33-369(c) ... The surviving or 
new corporation sh::lll thereupon and 
thereafter, to the extent consistent 
with its Certificate of Incorporation 
as in effect upon effecting the merger 
or consolidation, possess all the right, 
privilege, immunities and franchises, 
as well of a public as of a private nature, 
of each of the merging or consolidating 
corporation; and all property, real, 
personal, and mixed, and all debts due 
to each of the corporations so merged 
or consolidated, shall be taken and 
transferred to and vested in such single 
corporation without further act or deed; 
and the title to any real estate, or interest 
therein, v-ested in any of such corporation 
shall not re\•ert or be in any way impaired 
by reason of such merger or consolida-
tion. [Emphasis Added]. 
In this case, Heublein, the surviving corporation possessed 
:cdl the rights, privileges, immunities and franchises and all other choses 
in action, and all and every other interest belonging to or due Regina, the 
merged corporation, including the contingent contractual obligations 
which a.rose at the time of the loss covered by the United Pacific policy. 
POINT V. 
ACCILJENT COVERED BYCOMPREHENSI\'E 
LL'l.BILITY POLICY CASTS UPON INSURER 
-15-
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CO'\TI'\GE'd CO:\T IU CT U_ \ L Oil ur_; \T!Oi\S 
\\'HICif CU:\S I'lTl TL ,\\ li\DI;Tn J:.:D\LSS 0\V-
li\G TO THE COHPOI'v\TE E\SUHLD A:\D TIIAT 
ASSJ:::T OF I:\SCRED, LP0:'-1 ITS :\IEHGEH \VITI! 
A:'-JOTl!ER CORPOH_-\TI00!, L\UTO:\IATIC\LLY 
\ l~STS I:\ TilE SLH\'1\T\G COHPOHATIO:'\i BY 
VIHTCE OF THE GE:\EHAL STATUTES OF 
COl\:\EC:TICCT, ~ 33-3GD(c) (1968 as amended). 
Herein lies the heart of respondent's argument. The 
::'\ew York Supreme Court, Special Term, decision entitled Chathan _,
Corporation vs. Argonaut Insurance Company, 70 Misc. 2d 1028, 334 
N. Y.S.2d 959 (1972) is on all fours with this case and for that reason, 
extensive discussion of the case is warranted. In that case, plaintiff 
Helen Gerdes, allegedly sustained injury as a result of the collapse 
of a ladder manufactured by Baldwin Brush & Tools, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Baldwin"). The component parts of that ladder had been supplied by 
Duraluminum Ladder, :\Ifg. Co., Inc. (hereinafter "Duraluminum") 
which was a named insured under e; Products Liability Policy issuedb 
defendant, Argonaut Insurance Company, (hereinafter "Argonaut''). 
I 
Subsequent to the accident but prior to the lawsuit, Dure;luminum mer;' 
with Chatham Corporation (hereinafter "Chatham"), the successor 
corporation being Chatham. 
The plaintiff brought an action against Baldwin. In tw·t'. 
B<'ddwin lev-eled a Third- Pc,rty Complaint against Chatham. Ch~thcm 
brought a Decbratory .Tud~ment action ag<Jinsl Argon:J.ut to ddcrminc 
· ht f ,. par·tic~ unrher a Products Liability Im;urat the respective rrg s o c~.e - ~ 
- 16- I 
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Polley, .-\rgollaul had i:;suecl to Duraluminum. Concededly, the defen-
d.ttll _\) ;.un:.!Ut never did issue a policy of insurance to Chatham. On 
till' other hand, Argonaut admittedly insured Duraluminum at the time 
of :\Irs. Gerdes' accident, which took place before the merger between 
Ch:Jtham and Duraluminum. In the principal lawsuit, Duraluminwn was 
not named as a party to the action, 
The Court held that Argonaut was obligated to defend 
Chatham. Directing itself to the identical issue before this court; 
namely, the identity of the insured, the Supreme Court, Special Term, 
of Ncwo York stated: 
A question presented is one of identity of 
the insured rather than the usual issue 
of whether coverage is afforded under 
the policy. Argonaut's issuance to 
Duraluminum of the liability policy 
cast upon the insurer contingent 
contractual obligation which constitutes 
an indebtedness owing to the insured 
(Seider vs. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111.269 
N.Y. S. 2d 99,216 N. E. 2d 312) This 
asset of Duraluminum, upon itsmer-
ger with plaintiff, automatically 
vested in plaintiff as the surviving 
corporation by virtue of the provision of 
subd. (b), paragraph 2, No. 2 of Section 
906 of the Business Corporation Law. 
It may be said, under the construction 
given this statute, that nothing is lost 
by a merger of corporation and that 
any right lawfully belonging to any of 
the constituent corporations merged 
together cc1n be asserted by the sur-
viving corporation (Platt Corporatwn 
vs. Platt, 21 lL D. 2d 116, 120, 249 
N.Y.S.2d 7o, 79, affirmecl15 N. Y.2cl 
-17-
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70:>, 2~li \. Y. S. 2cl 7:1, /"~J, aff> r·nwrl 
15 ~ . Y . 2 d 7 0 5, 2 'J G i\ . Y . S. ~ d :l3 :J, 
204 :\.E.2d 4:J:,). Yic\\<'cl in tl>is 
light, tlw hilut·c tu indttdc· !Jur;dumi-
num zts a d<cfcndant in tiJC third partv 
action or to name it in the pleading; 
lS not bl::>l, provided il can be ascET-
tained that Duraluminum, r2.lhcr 
than some other party, is the subject 
of the compbint brought by the third 
party plaintiff. [Emphasis Added). 
The applicable New York statutes referred to above arc 
si.Inilar in all material in regards to the applicable Connecticut and L 
I 
Statutes. 
Applying the Chatham Corp. vs. r'\rgonaut Insurance Cc 
rule to the facts of this case, l.Tnited Pacific's issuance to Regina oftr, 
Comprehensive Liability Policy cast upon United Pacific contingent 
contractual obligations which constituted an indebtedness owing to Rei. 
This asset of Regina, upon its merger with Heublein, automatically 
\·ested in Heublein as the surviving corporation by virtue of the gener:. 
statutes of Connecticut, § ::l3-3G!:J(c) (1958 as amended). It may b, 
under the construction given this sLJtute, that nothing was lost by the 
merger of Hegina and Heublein and that any right lawfully belonging:c 
Regina could be asserted by liculJlein, the surviving corpontion. 
\'ic\,'Cd in this light, the f<.1illu·c of Shuput to include Regina as a defc 
in tl!e ;1ction or to name Regina in the pleading was not fatal, prD\'id': 
it ca.n be ascertained that H.cginc., rather lhan somt: othel' p:trty, 1\'Jo 
-1 <::-
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s .. :)- '- l uf th._. L<llilpl::ur,t brou~J1t by the plaintlff. Till' st 1pubted facts 
c'-- _-]· ickr•lify Rcgiru. l'nrtccl Pacific was tenered the defense but 
In !Lutford Fire Insurance Company vs. Union Graded 
Sc~·ool District i\'o. 73 of G~rvin County249 P.345 (1962), an action 
\vas commenced in the District of Garvin County by Union Graded 
School District No. 73 against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company 
to recover upon a fire insurance policy, alleged to have been issued 
by said company to School District i\'o. 29, Garvin County, Oklahoma, 
insuring a school building and contents which were destroyed by fire 
on February 16, 1924. Earlier, on June 18, 1923, School District i\'o. 
29, together with School Districts No. 40 and No. 67, were merged into 
lnion Graded District i\'o. 73, pursuant to law. Although the case is 
not directly on point, the accident having occurred after the merger, 
~.e·,·edhele3s, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma did recognize that the 
i~,s'~c·er of the merged or constituent district was obligated to indemnify 
tile s'.lrdving district for damages covered by the insurance policy 
pre·:iou3l]' issued to the merged or constituent corporation. A fortiori 
th2.; holding would apply where the accident covered by the policy occur-
reci prior to the merger. 
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PCJii\ l' \1. 
Tl!f~ "'\ClT.\L 1-'.\CTS .\S l~:\0\\:\ TO 
Till·: INSLHEH DETL!t:\IIC\E TilE 1:\-
Slil{Elt'S DCTY TO lJEFE0J]) \\1 lERE 
THEY 1\HE IN CONFLICT \\'ITll THE 
.t'\LLEC!\TIONS OF TilE CO'dPL\L\T. 
The gcncrc;l rule to the effect that the determindio 
n rJ: 
whether or not a clai.J:n made against the insured is one which by lhe 
terms of the contract the insurer is required to defend depends upon 
the facts stated in the complaint is based upon the ordinary or typicol 
situation in which there is no conflict between the fctcts as they are 
known to or ascertainable by the insurer. Stated differently, the ger.: 
rule does not take into account the possibility that such a divergence, 
exist; in fact, the rule may affirmatively presuppose the absence ther-
Accordingly, the cases supporting the general rule, as cited by the av 
lant in its Brief, are of hardly any value as authority in a situation v.i ' 
such divergence docs exist. In this regard, there are no Utah c"se; 
directly on point and there is a split of authority among tho.3e juris-
dictions who have considered the question. 
The better rule and apparent trend is tlnt the acbil 
facts as known to or ascertainable by the insurer determine ttw. ':i-
surer's duty to defend \'.here they arc in conflict with the allegc.tions 
of the cornpi:.li11t for tl1e reason that under the modern rules of civil 
1 notice: function anc! i:.; fra n1 Ec·d pl·ol'edurc the con1p ~unt scn•ec. a 
-20- j 
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l 
tr' J, ln turn, focuses on t~'ll' L2ts a:o they cxi:.;t rather tlnn on facts 
\•:hiL"i: might exist under the: theory of recovery in the complaint. 
c\ccordingly, the duty to defend should focus upon the facts as they 
c:<ist r~:thcr than upon the alleg0tions of the complaint which m:1y or 
ma} not control the ultimate determination of liability. 
In lV!iJ liken vs. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y. 
::J38 F. 2d 35, 40-41 (Tenth Circuit 1964) the tenth circuit court of 
appeals stated that: 
Here there were facts extran-
eous to the allegations of the 
pleading which could make out 
a case against the insured that 
would be covered by the policy. 
These facts could have been dis-
covered b,y appellee if it had 
made a reasonable investigation. 
Appellee's duty to defend must be 
determined in light of those facts 
and, when so considered we con-
clude that appellee had a duty to 
defend its insured's against the 
claims asserted in the pollution 
cases. Ha·,ing failed to defend 
its insured's, appellee is liable 
for costs and expenses they 
incurred ... 
In the case of Spruill Motors, Inc. vs. Universal 
l ~rci:cn·.riters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 521 P. 2d 403, 407 (1973) 
z,n :,c,_ion w2.s urought by Spruill :\lotors, Inc. to recover from its 
lini\'ers:d Underwrikrs Ins. Co., the judgment entered and 
-21-
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The dcfenclz,nt insur~tllc-c contpan; rcfusL·J lo clefcncl plaintiff insurr·d 
because tl1e complaint alleged acts outside coverage of plaintiff's lia. 
bility insurance: policy by alleging personal inJuries and property 
damage intentionally inflicted by Spruill's employees. By way of 
conclusion the Supreme Court of Kansas stated: 
It is our judgment that case 
law must give way to statu-
tory declarations. We must 
overrule Leonard and Brown, 
and any like decisions holding 
that an insurer may rely on 
the plaintiff's petition alone 
to determine whether there is 
a duty to defend. We adopt the 
rule in l\Iilliken [lVIilliken vs. 
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of 
New York, 338 F.2d 35 (Tenth 
Circuit 1964)] that an insurer 
must look beyond the effect of 
the pleadings and must consi-
der any facts brought to its 
attention or any facts which it 
could reasonably discover in 
determining whdhcr it has a 
dutv to defend. If those facts 
giv~ rise to a 'potential of lia-
bility' under the policy, the 
insurer bears a duty to defend. 
A!. ply1·n- a Sl.lnl·l~r rt1lc· tho Supremco Court of Arizona ) g 0 , ~
· I C 109 Ariz. 328,509 P:2d 222 in Kepner vs. Western F1re ns. .u., 
(l0 73) held that although the facts alleged in the complaint ostensibly 
l . e whcore other facts know" brought the case within the po 1cy cuverag , 
· cJ plainlv rntt th'.' C'c"Se outside> the to or :lsccrtainc:Jhl.-, Lly the 1nsurc J • 
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c.,·. c\': :~·· th~•t tl1•·cc: v:.1s :10 absolute duty to ddcnd. 
In C\larshall' s l :•it<!d StJ.tc:s Auto Supply, Inc. vs. 
~::1 (':,sualty Co. 3.~4 :\[iss. 455,188 S. W. 2d 529 (194;j), the 
s·.:prcmc Cour~ of :\lissouri ruled that an insurance company cannot 
iz:wr·c the actual facts of \'.·hich it has knowledge or could know from 
re:cson2l.Jle investigation, in determining its duty to defend under a 
Liability policy, although such facts are not alleged in the complaint in 
tlce action brought against the insured. 
Finally, in the case of United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co. vs. Briscoe, 205 Okla.618, 239 P. 2d 754 (1951), the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that where the actual facts of the 
case- are known to the insurer, the pleaded or alleged facts in the 
petition become incidental, in determining whether the insurer has 
the obligation to defend the action against the insured. 
Here, the defense of the original lawsuit tendered to 
trucccl Pacific \\'<:IS refused in spite of its full knowledge of the facts 
:J::fore this court. Clearly, the facts establish coverage under the 
oc.lic\· and corresponding duty to defend. The court shoulcl look to 
c: r- accLLl or ascertainable facts to determine the duty to defend and 
r0; rc.cotdct itself to the allegations in the complaint. 
-23-
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PUL\T \Jl. 
AFTEH A LOSS !L\S OCClilUtt:IJ ,\\D 
RIGHTS OF THE POLICY Hr\ V L AC-
CRUED, /\l\ c'\SSIG.\1\Il-::\T l\HY BE 
J\IIA DE \\ITHOUT TilE COI\SE:l\T OF 
THE INSURER, EVEN THOUG!I THE 
POLICY PHOHIBITS /\SSIGNMEJ'\T. 
Simply put, there has not been any change in risk of lo, 
where the accident occurred prior to the merger. The Utah Supreme 
Court in Time Finance Corp. vs. Johnson Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 45B 
P. 2d 873, 8 75 (196 9) recognized the general rule that after a loss has ' 
occurred and the rights of the policy have accrued, an assignment rna· 
made without the consent of the insurer, even though the policy pro-
hibits assignment. In that case, Time Finance Corporation initiated,. f 
action to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy covering a collisr. 
loss from Occidental Fire and Casualty Company, the insurer. The h·' 
sured, Johnson Trucking Company, had assigned all right, title and ir.· 1 
terest to the proceeds of its insurance claim against its insurer to TD··I 
Finance to secure a Promissory Note. Regarding the enforceability o~ 1 
the assigrunent, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In the instant action, since the property 
insured under the policy had previously 
been destroyed, the right to the proceeds 
was a chose in action, which could be 
assigned as any other chose in action, an~! 
anv clause or col'dition in the policy re-
st;icting assignment could not limit the 
ri;;ht of -assignment after the loss had 
occurred. 
The~ C:oud of _'\ppc,als of "'\rizona in St. Paul Fire & 
0-Ltrtnc ln.s. Co. vs. i\lL;t::;te Ins. Co. 25 i\riz. !\pp. 30'}, S43 P.2d F 
-24-
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After a loss hz,d incurr<ed and the 
rigbl s ~:nde ~- the policy have accrued 
an as3i;nment may be made without the 
consent of the insurer. The assign-
mc:nt is no·.·: reganlcd as a transfer 
of the policy itself, but ratl:er as a 
chose in 2ction. [Citation omitted]. 
The general rule appears to be 
that the liability and indemnity in-
surance policies are regarded 
as personal contracts and can-
not be assianed, especially 
where an assignment is express! v 
prohibited by the terms of the 
policy, unless the insurer con-
sents. [Citations omitted]. How-
mr,- this rule is based upo;the 
right of the insurer to choose its 
insured so as to know its risks. 
Therefore, it is not applicable 
when an assignment is made by 
an insured after the liability-
causing ev·ent has occurred. 
[Citation omitted]. In such a 
case, the general rule is that 
the assignment is not of the 
policy itself, but of a claim under, 
or right of action on, the policy, 
[Emphasis c\dded]. 
POE\'T VIII. 
OC\ ITS F.A. CE, THE UNITED Pi\. CIFIC 
POLICY 'OTHER INSURc\NCE/ EXCESS' 
CI~A. uSE IS ::\OT APPLICC>,BLE TO THIS 
DISPUTE. 
In the "other insurance" clause of the 1._:nited Pacific 
polle-e iss•.•,,cJ to Regina stat<es: 
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If :1t tllC l llllL of an CJCClll'J(•ntT 
any \alicl :111d collectible irHLJI':lllcc· 
is avail<•blc to the irtsllr<'d (in 
this or 2ny other GJ.rrier), ex-
cept insurance purchased to 
aprly in excess of the limit of 
li:J.bility of this policy, no in-
surance sh::tll be afford~·e­
under as respects such occurrence· 
except, if the applicable limit of ' 
liability of this policy exceeds the 
applicable limit of liability of such 
other insurance, this policy shall 
afford excess insurance over such 
other insurance sufficient to afford 
the insured a combined limit of 
liability equal to the limit of lia-
bility of this policy. Insurance 
under this policy shall not be 
construed to be concurrent or 
contributing with any other insur-
ance whatever. [Emphasis Added). 
It is universally recognized that where an insurance 
policy is clear and unambiguous, the Court should give its interpret;. 
tion in a cconlance with the hltlguagc of the policy. See: l\1arriot • s. 
Pacific Nation3.l Life Assur:mcc Company, 24 Gtah 2cl 182, 457 l'.2d 
881 (1870). l3y inter jccting th(' actual facts into the United Pacific 
"other insurance" clause it is clear and unan1biguous that on the date 
of the 2.ccident Hcgim' lnd no other collectible insurance. 
For ex2mple, tile United Pacific policy defines. the 
"insured" as ''The n~'.•ncj inslll·ed" which in this case v:oulcl be: 
1) Hc;':ina GLlpC Products Comp:my, a 
CzdjJorni~ cnl·por<ttion; 
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2) Hcgina Grape Products Company, a 
Cal t:~(_,t'lli3 corpor2.tion; 
(a) Ellena Brothers 
(b) Poca i\1as Wine Company 
(c) Garrett Bottling Company 
(d) San Sevine Vineyard Co. 
(e) Sycamore Valley Vineyards 
(f) Verdemont Vineyards Company; 
3) John B. Ellena and Arless T. Ellena. 
It also defines "occurrence" as 
... An Accident, an event or a 
continuous or repeated exposure 
to conditions causing, during the 
policy period, bodily inJury or 
property damage neither expected 
or intended by the insured. All 
injury or damage arising out of 
exposure due to substantially the 
same general condition shall be 
considered as arising out of one 
occurrence. 
Which i.n this case that would be the accident of George 
Shuput on December 31, 1970. 
Placing the actual facts in context, the "other insurance" 
clause would read: 
If at the time of an occurrence, 
December 31, 1970, any valid 
and collectible insurance is 
available to ... the insured, 
Regina Grapes Product Company. 
no insurance shall be aforded here-
under as re:spects such occurrenct, the 
accident on the 31st day of December, 
1()70. 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
